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As a society, we got almost everything wrong when it came to crack cocaine.
We declared a war on crack, and crack won. Beneath it all was a simple mistake
that we committed to, spent a fortune on, and codified. That mistake was a failure
to recognize that the driving force behind the spread of crack cocaine was not a
depraved gang, or race dynamics, or the CIA, or the very force of evil-it was
capitalism.
I. MYTH AND BUSINESS
In 1996, United States Congresswoman Maxine Waters attracted the attention
of the media and the nation by accusing the Central Intelligence Agency of
introducing crack cocaine into the United States. She called hearings to present
testimony supporting this charge, which she made clear in a press release:
"The origin of the crack cocaine trade in this country was led and
designed by the CIA and their paid Nicaraguan agents-who introduced
crack cocaine to South-Central Los Angeles," proclaimed Waters as the
hearing began. "The consequences of this wholesale dumping of cocaine
into inner cities by CIA-organized agents has been widespread
homelessness, violence, the destruction of families, and death."'
Waters was right about two things, and wrong about one. She was right about
the path of social destruction that crack mowed through many already troubled
communities. She was also right that crack originated in and around Los Angeles
(though perhaps not in the South-Central neighborhood). However, she was
wrong-famously wrong-about this being the work of the CIA. Instead, it was
the work of entrepreneurs making logical and very profitable business decisions.
While those decisions may have been illegal and immoral, they were directed not
by a government conspiracy, but by market forces.
Waters had made the mistake of relying on and exaggerating material drawn
from a single source. In this case, that source was a reporter for the San Jose
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Mercury News named Gary Webb, who had written a series of articles titled "Dark
Alliance." The first of these articles appeared on the front page of the Mercury
News, along with an image of a man smoking crack with the seal of the CIA
superimposed over him. 2
In those articles, Webb never made the claim that Waters did: That it was the
CIA which "designed" and "led" the crack cocaine trade in Los Angeles at the time
crack was gaining a beachhead in the United States. Webb had, actually, simply
shown that people allied with the CIA-backed "Contras" in Nicaragua had sold
powder cocaine to "Freeway" Ricky Ross, a prominent Los Angeles crack dealer, a
fact that the CIA later admitted.3
While crack was not created by the CIA or by an evil genius in a lab bent on
world domination, the truth is no less fascinating. Crack was created by
entrepreneurs who developed and marketed a product. Like many other
entrepreneurs, they did so in an environment where multiple versions of a product
competed for the same group of potential customers. Similarly, crack was not
spread across the United States by a gang or the mob or the government-rather, it
moved steadily into new markets through individuals and small groups seeking
greater profits.
Thirty years later, it is now clear that the story of crack's origins is not a spy
tale or a conspiracy narrative. Instead, it is a business story. The characters at the
center of it all are those who bought and sold things, developed new markets, and
created new products. It was our failure to see this plain truth which was the root
of our larger failure to address the problems created by the use and trafficking of a
shockingly dangerous narcotic: crack cocaine.
II. THE CREATION OF CRACK
Crack cocaine surfaced in the United States like oil bubbling up in a lake. Its
origins were obscure, and few people in power noticed the problem until it had
spread so widely that it was hard to miss.
Cocaine itself, of course, was nothing new. Powder and liquid cocaine were
used in the United States and marketed legally long before crack appeared. In the
mid-1800s, producers began to sell an extract of coca leaves, cocaine
hydrochloride, that was water soluble. The value of this product was that it could
lift moods, forestall sleep, and produce feelings of elation and euphoria.
Physicians began to recommend it as an anti-depressant, asthma remedy, and even
as a treatment for opiate addiction. Recreational use burgeoned as manufacturers
put cocaine in beverages, including (most famously) Coca-Cola. By the 1880s,
though, states began passing anti-cocaine laws, and gradually the federal
government restricted cocaine-first by requiring labels, then through taxation and
2 Nick Schou, The Truth in 'Dark Alliance', L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 18, 2006,
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/aug/I 8/opinion/oe-schoul 8.
SId.
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registration of legal providers, and finally by effectively ruling that cocaine had no
legitimate uses. By 1930, cocaine was a purely underground commodity, usually
sold in powder form.4
That status did not change for some 40 years, until a time of great social
changes in many areas of American life. Hidden among those upheavals is the fact
that the 1970s and 1980s were an era of great innovation in the field of illegal
narcotics. Of all the new developments of that time, though, crack cocaine was the
most significant. In the end, it was crack which was most alarming, which most
directly shaped American law, which obsessed politicians and the media for years,
and which sadly served as a too-easy proxy for tough racial issues within
American society.
As with many of history's greatest innovations, we do not know the name of
the person who first created what we now call "crack cocaine" (a moniker that was
created a decade later). We do know, however, that his or her invention probably
arose in Southern California in the mid-1970s.
Whoever it was who created crack seems to have had a strong understanding
of how narcotics are used and their physiological effects. Cocaine in its powder
form (which is the active ingredient in crack) is a unique and remarkable narcotic:
it is the only popular, recreational drug which serves simultaneously as a local
anesthetic and as a stimulant to the central nervous system. This combination has
obvious benefits to the user, as it can "numb out" pain while creating strong
5feelings of alertness and energy.
Cocaine also is subject to a variety of adaptations, which create valuable
possibilities for innovation. For example, how a drug is taken has a big impact on
the physical effects of that drug. Some narcotics, including cocaine, can be
ingested in at least three ways. First, it can be eaten or snorted into the nose.
Second, it can be smoked or inhaled. Third, it can be injected into the
bloodstream.
The method of ingestion used will usually define three different outcomes:
how quickly the drug affects the user, how long the stimulation lasts, and how
strong those effects are (that is, how "high" you get). Injecting a narcotic will
generally result in the fastest high, the shortest in duration, and the most intense,
while eating or snorting the substance will create the slowest onset, the longest
effect, and the least intense high. The fact that smoking cocaine gives a shorter
and more intense experience does make it more addictive than snorting powder
cocaine, because the user is likely to use the drug more frequently to sustain these
shorter highs.6
4 John P. Morgan & Lynn Zimmer, The Social Pharmacology ofSmokeable Cocaine: Not All
It's Cracked Up to Be, in CRACK IN AMERICA: DEMON DRUGS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 131, 131-32
(Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine eds., 1997).
5 ARNOLD M. WASHTON, COCAINE ADDICTION: TREATMENT, RECOVERY, AND RELAPSE
PREVENTION 11-12 (1989).
6 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING
POLICY 63, 65-66 (2007), available at
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In other words, what makes crack more addictive than powder cocaine is not
what it is, but how it is used-in either case, the active ingredient is cocaine.
Crack is not a different substance, but a version of that substance which can be
smoked.
Given this, it should not be surprising that people worked hard to develop a
form of cocaine that could be smoked. If this could be done, the result would
provide two great sales points, relative to powder cocaine: it would provide a
more intense experience for the user, and it would produce more reliable (addicted)
customers.
The development of a smokeable form of cocaine is a classic tale in the
development of a new market. Seeing the possibilities of profit, many people
worked to develop smokeable forms of cocaine in the 1970s, adding a variety of
substances to the active ingredient of powder cocaine.
The chemistry involved is fairly simple. In order to be smoked or otherwise
inhaled, powder cocaine has to undergo a chemical process which will allow the
drug to catch fire and vaporize at a lower temperature-it is impossible to vaporize
most powder cocaine without destroying it. In other words, you cannot just jam
powder cocaine in a pipe and smoke it; first, it has to be converted into a form that
will produce vapor (rather than melt) at the temperature of an open flame.
Powder cocaine is usually processed outside the country and then imported
into the United States in the form of cocaine hydrochloride. The process for
making cocaine hydrochloride is not complex. First, cocaine plants are made into
a paste, which is dissolved into hydrochloric acid and water. Potassium salt is then
added, and then ammonia. The resulting powder is often "cut" with inert
substances (for example, sugar or local anesthetics) prior to distribution.
The vaporization temperature of this cocaine hydrochloride can be lowered to
smokeable levels by mixing it with water and a base substance to remove or
neutralize the hydrochloric acid.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, all smokeable and inhalable forms of cocaine
which had been subjected to this process (including what later came to be called
"crack") were identified as a group as "freebase." There were five primary types
of freebase, distinguished by the substances used to combine with the powder
cocaine over heat and the process used to do so. Two of these-the "California
Clean-Up Method" and the "Careful California Method"-used ether as a solvent.
These presented special problems, due to the dangerous volatility of ether. Two
others, the "Ammonia Method" and the "Spoon Method," used ammonia
hydroxide as the solvent. The fifth way was called the "Baking Soda Method."9
http/www.ussc.gov/Legislative and_Public_Affairs/CongressionalTestimony andRepor DrLgTopics/200
705_RtC CocaineSentencingPolicy.pdf.
7 Id. at 62.
8 Morgan & Zimmer, supra note 4, at 133.
9 Ronald K. Siegel, Cocaine Smoking, 14J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY
FORUM 271, 312-13 (1982).
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It was the last of these, the Baking Soda Method, that created what we now
know as crack cocaine. Using this method, a "chef' would simply mix water with
powder cocaine and baking soda and heat the resulting paste. As it dries, the
substance "rocks up" to form small pebbles, which can then be smoked.10 Thus,
during this early period of development, crack was just one of several varieties of
freebase cocaine.
The Baking Soda Method did not necessarily produce the best product. In
fact, relative to the products produced by other methods, baking soda-based rocks
were sometimes referred to as "garbage freebase" because they contained both
impurities from the powder cocaine and the baking soda, which did not cook off
during the process." While the other processes purified the cocaine, the Baking
Soda Method did the opposite-it further diluted the active ingredient.
Crack initially spread from West to East in the United States, beginning in
Southern California and landing on the East Coast about 1980. It was only then, in
East Coast cities, that this product of the Baking Powder Method was first referred
to as "crack," because of the crackling noise it made when it was cooked. 12
At about the same time that baking soda-based crack was starting to appear
outside of California, a singular incident put freebase cocaine on the national radar.
On June 9, 1980, popular comedian Richard Pryor was admitted to the hospital
with severe burns. According to police, he had burned himself accidentally while
cooking up freebase for his own use. At that time, this was common-crack was
cooked up by the consumer, not the dealer, who simply sold powder cocaine to the
end user.13 That left to the buyer the task of creating the freebase over heat, often
using the "California" methods which required the use of volatile ether.
One reason the Pryor incident received such widespread attention was
because of the severity of his injuries, with over half of his body suffering severe
burns. Later in his career, Pryor described the burning as a suicide attempt, and
even incorporated the tragedy into his stand-up comedy.14
It is not surprising that a wealthy celebrity like Pryor (rather than poorer Los
Angelenos) would be found using freebase. Freebasing cocaine using the ether
method was expensive, because the process removed impurities and thus required
more cocaine per dose, not less.'5 This contrasted sharply with the process which
would prevail-the Baking Soda Method that produces crack. There, rather than
'0 Id. at 313.
" EDITH FAIRMAN COOPER, THE EMERGENCE OF CRACK COCAINE ABUSE 6-7 (2002).
12 Id. at 6.
13 Id. at 9.
14 Comedian Richard Pryor Dies at 65, CNN U.S., Dec. 10, 2005,
http://articles.cnn.com/2005-12-10/us/pryor.obit1_richard-pryor-comedian-movies-multiple-
sclerosis-stand-up-comedy?_s=PM:US.
15 Richard Pryor's Tragic Accident Spotlights a Dangerous Drug Craze: Freebasing,
PEOPLE, June 30, 1980, http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20076864,00.html
[hereinafter Dangerous Drug Craze].
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impurities being taken out, a significant impurity (baking soda) is added, and
remains a part of the resulting rocks.
The emergence of baking soda-based crack over other freebase methods is
typical of any kind of developing technology in a market. Often, different
alternatives co-exist briefly before a methodology emerges which is adopted by the
industry as a whole. For example, we live in an age where all bicycles feature two
equal-sized wheels. However, in the late 1800s, a variety of bicycle designs
competed with one another. There were high-wheeled bicycles with a huge front
wheel and a tiny rear wheel; another design with a large rear wheel and a small
front tire; and even a high-wheeled tricycle, all of which competed with bikes with
two equal-sized wheels.' 6 Over time, the modem version emerged as preferable to
the market, and now we only see high-wheeled bicycles in parades and museums.
The evolution of freebase cocaine went through a similar developmental
period, and with a like result-you are about as likely to find someone using ether
to freebase cocaine today as you are to find someone riding a high-wheeled
tricycle to school.
The present narcotics landscape provides simple proof that crack prevailed
over competing technologies in the cocaine freebase market, but we can only guess
at the reasons why. A look at the market being served, though, offers some ideas.
First, the Baking Soda Method was easy. Everyone knows how and where to
get baking soda, while most of us would be stumped if asked to pick up some ether
on the way home from work. Importantly, it was also less dangerous because
there was no application of an open flame to volatile substances such as ether. No
one wanted to end up as the "next Richard Pryor."
Second, the Baking Soda Method allowed the chemical processing to be
transferred from the user to the seller.17 If the California (ether based) methods of
freebasing had prevailed, there never would have been such a thing as a crack
dealer (or freebase dealer), because the end user would be purchasing plain old
powder cocaine, which he would then dissolve in ether in the privacy of his own
home. The buyer did the work of creating the freebase.' 8 Once the conversion to
freebase shifted from buyer to seller with the market dominance of the Baking
Soda Method, concrete business opportunities arose for those sellers. For example,
the seller can easily make greater profits through the defining process of crack-
making: "cutting" the powder cocaine with baking soda before sale. In addition,
16 A brief history of the bicycle is available on the website of the Pedaling History Bicycle
Museum, which can be found at http://www.pedalinghistory.com/PHhistory.html. In the end, it was
the development of pneumatic tires that aided the primacy of bikes with two evenly-sized tires, a
chain, and pedals.
17 Michael Massing, Crack's Destructive Sprint Across America, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 1, 1989,
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/01/magazine/crack-s-destructive-sprint-across-
america.html?src=pm.
18 Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, The Crack Attack: Politics and Media in the Crack
Scare, in CRACK IN AMERICA: DEMON DRUGS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 18, 18 (Craig Reinarman & Harry
G. Levine eds., 1997).
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crack is a value-added product relative to powder cocaine-as a smokeable
product, it offers a higher and quicker high than powder cocaine.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, crack could reach a price point at or
below $5 per use, opening up whole new markets. Compared to other types of
freebase production, the Baking Soda Method produced the least expensive
product. As the Richard Pryor incident revealed, other methods removed
impurities from powder cocaine, meaning that a user needed more cocaine, not
less, to make freebase. In contrast, the Baking Soda Method added an adulterant to
the mix, and that adulterant (baking soda) was very cheap. Street samples of crack
tend to contain only about 10-40% cocaine. As a result, rocks could be produced
and sold for as little as $2 on the street.19
III. THE SPREAD OF CRACK
The development of crack in Los Angeles was a typical market process-one
product won out from others through competition, because it had certain inherent
advantages that responded to demand in that market. Just as it was these market
forces, not a conspiracy, that led to the creation and development of crack, it was
market forces, rather than gangs or organized crime, that primarily led to crack's
emergence in so many disparate American cities and towns. Like many other
products, what emerged in California could eventually be found in Peoria.
While powder cocaine had been a product for the rich and indulgent, now a
similar or even more intense high was available to people of lesser means. The
appeal of crack did not have inherent geographic limits. People in many places
desire a cheap high.
The potential for crack to become a national problem was clearly foreseen
before it happened. It was no secret that a cheap form of freebase cocaine could
result in much higher addiction rates, as people who previously could not afford it
were lured to try cocaine. In fact, in 1979, some six years before the first mention
of "crack" in the national press (in a New York Times article on drug treatment), 20
Congress was put on notice of this risk. In July of that year, Robert C. Peterson, a
researcher at the National Institute on Drug Abuse, testified at a hearing before a
House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. In his testimony, he
said this of cocaine: "At present, we are confronted with a drug which has a
moderately high potential for abuse, were it more readily available at much lower
cost."21
Simultaneous with this prediction being made, it was being fulfilled. At the
same time Dr. Peterson was testifying, the Baking Soda Method was beginning to
predominate in California and make its presence known in other cities. With the
'9 Morgan & Zimmer, supra note 4, at 134.
20 BRUCE A. JACOBS, DEALING CRACK: THE SOCIAL WORLD OF STREETCORNER SELLING 3
(1999).
21 FAiRMAN COOPER, supra note 11, at 14-15.
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spread of crack, the drug world was about to change radically.
One possible catalyst to that change was occurring at about the same time that
crack prevailed over other freebase variations. In the early 1980s, the primary
shipment route of drugs (and particularly cocaine) into the United States was not
via Mexico, but through the Caribbean and directly from South America. Between
1980 and 1983, there was a glut of powder cocaine in both places, and prices were
dropping.22 This glut coincided with the development of crack, which may, in
tum, have helped end that oversupply as the number of cocaine users increased
across the United States. For cocaine wholesalers in the international trade, new
markets created through a new product (crack) may have saved the day.23
Exactly how crack spread across the nation from Los Angeles is not widely
chronicled. What is beyond dispute is that it did find a beachhead in other major
cities within a few years. By 1983, crack was available in Los Angeles, Miami,
Houston, and New York City. Prior to that, it was largely limited to California, as
occasional reports of the time revealed. For example, on June 30, 1980, People
magazine published a report on the Pryor incident which also detailed the growth
of cocaine freebase.24 Titled "Richard Pryor's Tragic Accident Spotlights a
Dangerous Drug Craze: Freebasing," the article includes a level of incisive
reporting one might not expect from People, which included a good description of
the geographic limits of freebase at the time:
One expert, UCLA research psychopharmacologist Ronald Siegel,
suggests that as many as one million Americans have tried freebasing.
How-to kits can be found in head shops from Miami to San Francisco for
$15 to $20 apiece. The number of regular freebasers is of course much
smaller-and narcotics police in Chicago, New York, Nashville and
Houston say they are only vaguely aware of the trend. "Freebasing is
more prevalent in the West," one Nashville cocaine dealer explains. "In
California it is the accepted way of getting high."25
Eventually, of course, crack cocaine did hit other cities, and hit them hard.
One might imagine that this geographic movement was driven by a nationwide
trafficker, the mob, or a gang, but the truth is not that simple. In fact, crack spread
largely through the actions of unconnected groups and individuals, not through the
actions of organized crime or street gangs.
In short, a crack dealer would peel away from the crowded markets of New
York or Miami, find a smaller city, and begin selling crack in that less-saturated
22 Id. at 22.
23 See Jesse Katz, Claire Spiegel & Ralph Frammolino, Paper: No Crack Conspiracy -- Probe
Finds Market Forces, Many Dealers - Not U.S. Plot, SEATrLE TIMES, Oct. 20, 1996,
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19961020&slug-2355274.
24 Dangerous Drug Craze, supra note 15.
25 Id.
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market. For example, a crack dealer in the Bronx might visit Philadelphia, and
find that crack cost twice as much there than it did in his hometown. He would see
an opportunity and head up to Boston to increase his profits, or send an associate.
The result was more competition in the city infiltrated, which would lower prices,
which would in turn cause some dealers to spin out to smaller cities. From a huge
city to a big city to a smaller one, it was through this process that crack would
eventually hit the street in Buffalo or Albany or Lowell. 26
Some referred to this process as "disorganized crime," with many
27entrepreneurs doing the same thing at the same time. That appellation, though, is
inaccurate. The spread of crack across the country through the action of individual
dealers seeking more lucrative markets was very much "organized," in the sense
that it was structured and directed by simple market forces. Entrepreneurs were
scattered by the lure of potential profit in what, to an economist, is a very
predictable and organized pattern.
Economists would recognize this pattern readily, and note that one driving
force in such a pattern is low barriers to entry. That is, it did not take huge
amounts of capital or much expertise to sell crack: the baseline requirement was
simply access to powder cocaine and a willingness to break the law. In the 1980s
there were millions of people who met both criteria. With low barriers to entry,
competition is furious and fast, with many competitors entering the market rapidly.
It was this dynamic-lots of participants in an open market which required little
more than a disrespect for the law-which in large part fueled both the rapid
spread of crack and the violence that accompanied that drug's sweep across the
continent.
Typical of these entrepreneurs was Delroy Edwards, a Jamaican immigrant
who sold drugs in Brooklyn housing projects. When he became aware of crack, he
began to sell it along with other narcotics he was already dealing. He soon found
he was mostly selling the new drug, and lots of it. Edwards looked to expand his
business, but New York City was already chock-full of crack dealers. However, in
other cities where there was less volume, customers were paying three to four
times as much as Edwards was charging in New York City. Like any good
28businessman, Edwards went to where the profits were greater.
First, Edwards went to Washington, D.C., then expanded further to
Philadelphia and Baltimore. At its peak, his organization, known as the "Rankers,"
employed fifty people and made $100,000 a day. At the same time, of course,
others were expanding into the same territories, and then into smaller and further-
off cities and towns.29 By late 1989, the Rankers had disintegrated in the face of
violence, poor leadership, and arrests, but by that time the new freebase drug,
crack, had strong roots in new communities.
26 Massing, supra note 17.
27 id.
28 id.
29 id.
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According to a report in the New York Times, the Rankers were one of about
forty groups with similar origins. 30 The influence of these Jamaicans, who often
called their organizations "posses," was substantial according to that 1989 Times
article:
Most, like the Rankers, took shape as gangs during the 1980 Jamaican
election, then fled to the United States and regrouped. Here, their 10,000
to 20,000 members, organized in posses with as few as 25 members and
as many as several hundred, keep incessantly on the move, slipping in
and out of the many Jamaican communities scattered across the
country.
Intriguingly, this press report recognized the bare fact that these posses relied
on good business practices:
"They're very good businessmen," says John A. O'Brien, an agent
with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (B.A.T.F.), the
Federal agency that most closely monitors the posses. "They follow the
law of supply and demand. When they see that a vial of crack selling for
$5 in New York will get $15 in Kansas City, they'll move in." New York
is their "training school," O'Brien says, "like going to Wharton. They'll
take a guy doing a good job in Harlem and send him to open an office in
the Midwest." On his arrival in the new area, the posse sales rep will
rent a motel room and conduct a market survey of sorts to determine the
most lucrative spot in town. Then he'll rent an apartment or, better yet,
get a single female to lend him one in return for crack.32
One dynamic that is reflected in the story of Delroy Edwards was a very low
"opportunity cost" to him when he chose to sell crack. To an economist,
opportunity cost is the price of not doing something else-that is, what
opportunities are given up to pursue a line of business. If, for example, a surgeon
wants to start a talk show, there is an opportunity cost in doing so because she will
not be able to use that time and energy conducting surgery. If the talk show pays
less than performing surgery, the surgeon will lose income and should consider
that opportunity cost in making her decision.
For many of those who became crack dealers, both selling crack in the first
place and moving into lesser cities involved little opportunity cost. Like Edwards,
it is likely that many of these first entrepreneurs were already selling drugs, so
there was no opportunity cost to them in simply selling a more profitable and
popular narcotic. Similarly, in spinning off to new cities, it did not necessarily
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 id.
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mean a lost opportunity-it was simply a more profitable way of doing what they
already did. It was not a surgeon doing a talk show; it was more like a surgeon
doing more lucrative elective surgery. For Delroy Edwards, selling crack and
expanding to new territories were rational choices, and thousands of those rational
choices combined to create the viral urban plague of the 1980s, whose legacy still
haunts our cities, our law, and our very sense of what might yet upend us.
IV. THE TAKE-AWAY: CRACK, BUSINESS, AND AIDS
To be from Detroit (as I am) is like having a lover who breaks your heart
again and again. Each heartbreak has its own song, though, and the saddest of
these may be the one that goes with that city's devastation wrought by crack
cocaine.
For the first five years of my life, I grew up on Harvard Road near the corner
of Warren on the east side of the city. Just blocks from that house now lay entire
city blocks devoid of human life-just large rectangles of weeds and trees, the
houses and the people and the very sense of a human community having been
removed. On those blocks, the homes were all abandoned, so they were torn down
and hauled away in slabs to a landfill. It is an eerie thing to drive through a major
city and to find these "ghost blocks" one after another, block after block, as you
drive towards the rebuilt auto plants on Conner Avenue.
For a very different five years much later in life, I was a federal prosecutor in
Detroit, and during that time I prosecuted crack cases. However, over time I
became disillusioned with that project.33 What changed was not my perception of
how destructive crack can be to individuals and the social fabric. I only needed to
drive through the ghost blocks near my old neighborhood to see that. Rather, what
changed was any sense that what we were doing worked. All evidence was to the
contrary. In fact, it seemed that our efforts to lock up as many young black men as
possible were having further detrimental effects on the community we were trying
to serve.
Eventually, the reason we were not accomplishing anything became clear.
Narcotic distribution is a business-a giant, lucrative, international business.
Those entities that are successful in this business share certain qualities with any
other business-they manage money well, hire with care, identify growth markets,
and deal well with both vendors and sales networks. Also, like any good business,
they make sure that the lowest-paid workers in the network are easily replaceable,
since there will be high turnover in those jobs which do not require any particular
skill. Unfortunately, our drug laws target these easily-replaced workers: the
mules, the street sellers, and the guys who cook the powder cocaine into crack.
3 I have written elsewhere about this change in perspective, which was largely attributable to
the arguments of Assistant Federal Defender Andrew Densemo. See generally Mark Osler, The
Power of Futile Speeches, HUFFINGTON PosT, June 17, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-
osler/the-power-of-futile-speec_b_878186.html.
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That is because it is those workers who most often handle the drugs themselves,
and our narcotics laws use the weight of the drugs possessed as a proxy for
culpability-a proxy which utterly fails to take into account the business model at
the heart of the problem. Those who are most culpable and richly rewarded by the
drug trade, on the other hand, may never handle any drugs at all, and are usually
protected from scrutiny by layers of secrecy and silence.
To begin looking at this operation as a business, let us consider another type
of business which many of us see in operation with some regularity: a bagel shop.
The bagels are made by low-paid workers who perform repetitious tasks; the
dough is shipped to the store in bulk, and the job of the bagel bakers is simply to
form the dough into bagels and bake them shortly before the customer buys them.
Some bagel shops have a window where you can watch this happen, and also see
the large-print instructions on the wall. The entire operation is set up with the
understanding that these workers will leave frequently and need to be replaced.
For example, the large-print sign and simple instructions tell us that new workers
in that area will need little or no training, and very little skill.
If we wanted to shut down that bagel shop by arresting some of the people
associated with it, the best way would be to take out the people who have unique
skills-the person who arranges shipment of the dough, for example, or who
handles the cash flow. The worst way, of course, would be to arrest all the bagel
bakers, because they would be so easily replaced. Yet, it is the bagel bakers who
have the most bagels in their hands at any one time.
Our current model of addressing narcotics is to pour resources into sweeping
up the bagel bakers, because they are the ones holding the most "weight" of the
illegal substance, and the easiest to catch. It is no wonder, then, all these years
later, that the "war on drugs" has been unsuccessful.
The impact of this unfortunate choice was particularly acute in crack cocaine
trafficking, where for decades those who sold or possessed crack were much more
harshly punished than those who sold powder cocaine. Within the federal
sentencing guidelines and the mandatory minimum terms made a part of the
narcotics statutes, one gram of crack cocaine was punished the same as 100 grams
of powder cocaine.34 This incredible disparity heightened the effect revealed in the
bagel shop analogy above, because crack is usually "cooked up" by street-level
dealers; at every point before that, at higher levels of culpability, the drug is in its
powder form. It is only shortly before the product is sold to consumers that crack
(like a bagel) takes its final form. The 100:1 ratio gave federal agents express
incentives to target the least culpable defendants-the ones who are most easily
replaced-because crack was found only in their hands.
Though crack cocaine is still in widespread use across the United States, it is
no longer growing as a drug of choice. This could be because other drugs have
34 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (2005); 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006). This
ratio was finally removed from federal law in favor of an 18-to-I ratio by the Fair Sentencing Act of
2010. Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372.
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come along, or because its users died out, or it could be that the trafficking in crack
finally moved behind closed doors. Interestingly, the decline coincided not with a
heightening of law enforcement action, but a slackening. In fact, the high levels of
use sustained almost twenty years of draconian measures intended to control that
use. Now that the epidemic has to some degree burned itself out (as all epidemics
do), now is the right time to trace the arc of this particular tragedy and draw
lessons from it.
Those lessons are often surprisingly simple. Perhaps most obviously,
legislation and tactics for fighting narcotics trafficking need to be the product of
systemic, goal-oriented analysis that takes economics into account. Perhaps the
most important person on a team developing legislative strategies to combat
narcotics should be a business expert-someone who knows what makes a
business fail, since the goal of narcotics-fighting is to make a business fail.35 The
history of crack in America reveals nothing so clearly as the wrong way to fight
narcotics, and it is an important and expensive lesson to have learned-if we do
learn.36
In hindsight, it is easy to see: the creation of crack, and its spread, were the
product of simple economic forces-the same ones that impel the creation and
spread of other popular consumer products. Yet, somehow, we never took the
most essential first step in addressing the scourge of crack: evaluating the problem
as a product of simple market forces.
In the modern language of business, we might describe the spread of crack as
"viral": it infected one area, replicated (as more people entered the business of
selling crack), and then spread to a new part of the body. It is the dream of every
entrepreneur to go viral-the ultimate business success.
The analogy to the spread of a virus is particularly striking when we look at
the other dark shadow growing across the public health landscape in and around
1980: AIDS. Though they were unconnected, the symmetry between the spread
of crack and AIDS at the same time is plain and stark.
As crack was coalescing as the dominant freebase form in California in 1980
and 1981, the first odd cases of Kaposi's Sarcoma began to occur in New York
35 My own view is that the best tactic to create business failure in drug networks would be
through targeted forfeitures designed to restrict cash flow and credit, which are the real lifeblood of
any business. See generally Mark Osler, What Would It Look Like If We Cared About Narcotics
Trafficking? An Argument to Attack Narcotics Capital Rather Than Labor, 15 UDC/DCSL L. REv.
113 (2011).
36 While I write here in support of policy changes, it is not written in support of a policy of
narcotic legalization, though I do think that legalization is a principled and sometimes appealing
argument. What stops me from weighing in favor of that option is simply those ghost blocks, and the
knowledge that the tragedy in those ghost houses, now gone, was created not only by the selling of
drugs, but the using of drugs like crack cocaine. I know from the cases I worked on and from those
who work in the city that there were children hungry while their mother searched for crack money by
selling oral sex for $5; that there were children who were given the drug; and that at the same time
that jobs were leaving the city of Detroit, so were the skills of potential workers who were too
addicted to do much of anything. None of this would have been changed had crack been legal.
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among young gay men. Though AIDS cases had probably cropped up in the
United States before this time (just as freebase was used, unnoticed, in Los
Angeles during the same period), these unusual diagnoses spurred some of the first
public signs of awareness that a dark new disease was present, as the Center for
Disease Control formed a task force to examine the phenomenon in June 1981.3
Just as crack did not have its name yet, at this point neither did AIDS." And just
like crack, AIDS slowly infected communities, often moving from the largest cities
(like New York) to smaller ones.
The similarities extend even to origin myths. In the same way that
Congresswoman Waters alleged that crack was a creature of a CIA plot, both a
President of South Africa (Thabo Mbeki) and a Nobel Peace Prize Laureate
(Kenyan ecologist Wangari Maathai) claimed that the CIA created and propagated
the AIDS virus. The CIA/AIDS link even made Time magazine's "Top Ten" list
of conspiracy theories.
The odd symmetry between crack and AIDS went unnoticed at the time each
was emerging in the United States, because neither was understood or even
consistently named. As we can (from a historical perspective) now see clearly, the
spread of AIDS followed the principles of biology, while crack followed the laws
of economics.
Importantly, AIDS was dealt with as a public health crisis (albeit, often with
strikingly little sympathy for the victims), while crack was dealt with as a law
enforcement crisis-that is, we did attack AIDS using biology, but we did not
attack crack with economics. With AIDS, federal efforts involved using those
same principles of biology to identify and neutralize the root cause of the illness
and the means by which it was transmitted. In addressing crack, though, the
federal focus was on identifying and incarcerating the users and sellers, with little
apparent effort given to discerning root causes of the epidemic or the economic
transmission of the problem from city to city.
The outcomes of these two federal efforts were very different. CDC and other
government-funded scientists (in cooperation with other sources) eventually, but
relatively successfully, addressed the AIDS crisis, saving hundreds of thousands of
lives. A biological event was confronted using the science of biology. The
symmetry between AIDS and crack ends there. In our rush to incarcerate we never
applied the governing laws of economics to crack, and never effectively dealt with
that epidemic. The cost of that error in terms of lives and human misery is nearly
incalculable.
n History of AIDS Up to 1986, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/aids-history-86.htm (last
visited Dec. 30, 2012).
38 Id.
3 Conspiracy Theories, TIME, July 20, 2009, http://www.time.contime/specials/packages/
completelist/0,29569,1860871,00.html.
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